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Management compensation design for a banking firm
(Preliminary)
“Do we have tools to affect managerial incentives more directly? What do we have to
learn to be able to use them effectively?”
-Raghuram G. Rajan1
Abstract
The extant of indigenous literature on bad loans concentrate to analyze the factors that would increase
efficient credit allocation by public sector banks in India.. RBI, the Central Bank in India, has mostly tried
to promote priority sector lending through various policy steps. However, the list has only become longer. The
paper proposes an incentive contract based on information asymmetry model to approach the problem.
1.0 Introduction
Theories based on managerial compensation have largely limited itself to cash and equity-
linked schemes2. These theories were able to justify the extant of literature based on this
traditional approach to compensation. However, empirical findings such as Bebchuk and
Jackson (2005) and Sundaram and Yermack(2006) showed that for US firms, debt-linked
instruments also influenced the pay package of the top management. This stream of analysis
had never been formally assessed by the theorist.
Alex Edmans (2006) paper was the first attempt in this direction. He proposed that Inside
Debt was a more effective solution to agency cost pertaining to debts than private benefits
or bonus. He showed that the model was able to alleviate the insensitivity towards
liquidation value of previous performance measures.
This paper directs the theory specifically to banking firms. A manger in a bank-firm has a
compensation plan based on a fixed wage and a performance based incentive which is
related to his immediate past performance. However, as the nature of competition changes
without much change in the basic product portfolio, it is desirable for the managers to be
innovative and acquire knowledge to improve productivity. But a backward looking
compensation scheme which punishes him if a new knowledge or process fails. He has no
incentive to test his newly acquired knowledge and would like to continue with the same
process which has a higher probability to give better immediate incentive. Bank-firms due to
its structure and regulation have a stratified compensation plan which doesn’t give any
incentive for failed trials. Therefore, any bank-firm which follows a performance based pay
and punishes failed trials may have adverse or no effect in acquiring new knowledge and
innovate.
1 At the Bank of Spain Conference on Central Banks in the 21st Centuryi, June 8, 2006
SOURCE: http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2006/060806.htm#P9_224
2 See Gomez-Mejia [1994] and Murphy [1999] for a literature review on compensation. Much of the research on
compensation is a part of larger area of research on incentives within industrious firms, like designing of performance
measures (e.g., Indjejikian [1999] and also Prendergast [1999]). Some papers incorporate corporate governance variables
into the analysis (e.g.,Core, Holthausen, and Larcker [1999] and Talmor and Wallance [2002] ) .
A theory of banking firm must incorporate the roles of a firm, a financial intermediary and a
regulated enterprise. Unlike an industrial firm, the manager maximizes his utility under
constraint by regulatory body and share holder. A compensation theory must be able to
justify the interest of all the stakeholders and work without much renegotiation of contract.
The contribution of this paper is that those banks which have compensation package which
encourages innovative thinking and knowledge application
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.0 discusses the related literature . Section 3.0
present the bank model and how inside debt reduce the risk sifting behavior of management.
Section 4.0 gives a numerical comparison. Section 5.0 concludes the paper. Appendix
contains the proofs of the propositions.
2.0 Related Literature
Managerial compensation has mostly been related to equity –linked performance measures.
The possibility that debt can be linked to performance has received little attention both for
banking firms and industry firms. Sundaram and Yermack were not able to find a theoretical
explanation to their empirical analysis.
In the seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that the manager’s salary must
be able to limit risk-shifting and if that is possible, then there is no requirement for inside
debt. They theorized the agency cost of debt. Edmans showed that manager’s salary was an
inadequate solution.
3.0 Model of a Banking Firm
3.1 Assumptions
We propose to model a discrete two state, four time period (t= -1,0, 1, 2) of n (=2) banks
having a continuum of exante customers endowed with a unit of consumption goods. At t=-
1, the compensation contract is stated to the managers. The bank model is similar to that of
Bris and Cantale (1998) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with significant differences. Bris
and Cantale emphasized on the self interest of the managers; our objective is to model the
optimal contract for compensation.
Consider a situation where each bank in the economy can invest in only one project. The
project requires an investment of (1, )iI n . The project is financed through a deposit D (t=0)
or raised through the market S (t=0). The customer has no incentive to “hoard” goods
between t =0 and t=1. Only at t=1, their liquidity requirements is revealed. The value of the
firm, at t=0, is V0 = D0+S0 ,which is verifiable and publicly observable. If the project is
liquidated at t=1, the productive technology returns only the salvage value (r≤1) .The yield at
t=2 is R (>1). Manager chooses the structure of the balance sheet at t=0, Asset is balanced
by the loan portfolio3 and the risk less reserves (  ), if any. The cost of credit4 is iI ,I
where (0≤α<1). Loan repayment (1+i) I equal:
3 Here the “portfolio” comprises of one project only. Later more project choices would be added to the
model.
4 Cost incurred in identification and official procedures associated with the Investment.
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For tractability, there are only two types of projects to choose from, “high risk” (H) and
“low risk” (L). Project H has a probability pH to be “Good” and the bank has a value of VHG ,
if the project is “bad” (1- pH ) , the value of the bank is VHB. Similarly for project L, the value
of the bank is VLG with pL if project is good and VLB with (1-pL) if otherwise. These values
are observable only to the managers but after t=1. Assume, VHG > VLG > V0 > VLB > VHB
and pH > pL . All payoffs will be realized at t=2. Shareholder’s interest at time t=1. The
expected value of the shareholder at the end of the project (t=2) is:
 2( ) max (1 ) ,0E S i I R D    (1)
Here, ө = level of repayment.5. Let T be the threshold value for which the equity holder
has a positive value. Equation (1) can be expressed as :
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3.2managerial compensation and effort
A manger in a bank-firm has a compensation plan based on a fixed wage and a performance
based incentive which is related to his immediate past performance. However, as the nature
of competition changes without much change in the basic product portfolio, it is desirable
for the managers to be innovative and acquire knowledge to improve productivity. But a
backward looking compensation scheme which punishes him if a new knowledge or process
fails. He has no incentive to test his newly acquired knowledge and would like to continue
with the same process which has a higher probability to give better immediate incentive.
Bank-firms due to its structure and regulation have a stratified compensation plan which
doesn’t give any incentive for failed trials. Therefore, any bank-firm which follows a
performance based pay and punishes failed trials may have adverse or no effect in acquiring
new knowledge and innovate.
The contribution of this paper is that those banks which have compensation package which
encourages innovative thinking and knowledge application.
5   , '  f default probability manager s effort 
Principal –agent models supports pay-for-performance scheme. Harris and Raviv (1976) and
Holmstrom(1979) suggested that performance based incentive can encourage efforts put
forth by the agents. Empirical evidence supports the above model for example,
Lazear(2000) . But it can be argued that the model holds good for routine, repetitive jobs
where effort is the main input which determines the output. There is no evidence to support
the view when other factors ,besides effort also influences the output .
One strand of literature
Manager’s compensation is dependent on the value of the firm, denoted as ƒ (V0). This
endogenous component is strictly monotonic in firm value with an upper limit of V . This is
to prevent managers from destroying firm value and run. The lower bound is denoted by V .
Thus,
HG HG HG HG( ) ( ) ( ) ( )V f V f V f V f V V    
Manager’s effort can improve the performance of the banking firm and it is visible to the
shareholders in the time period (t=0, 1, 2). The effort level (0, *)x x is only constrained by
the personal cost of the manager assumed to be a quadratic function 2x . The effort of the
manager does not change when the firm is solvent and when the firm is bankrupt. The
probability associated with the loan portfolio is un affected by the manager’s effort. But the
probability to default is influenced by the effort put in by the manager and the polar
condition of the probability to default (pD ) can be determined for both the state of the
projects as :
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When *x x , pD (0) and when 0x ,pD (1). The expected equity value for the long term
shareholders at time t=2, can be given as:
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When D > , the above equation reduces to:
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The expression is similar for the other loan portfolio “L”. under solvent condition
manager’s compensation is a portion of net worth (γ). Hence, it can be assumed that the
manager holds a share (ψ) of the equity where, ,2[0, max ( )]H LE S  . Banks, like a typical
firm, has to keep the shareholder’s interest into consideration. The performance of the
managers is determined by the shareholder’s value maximization. So in our model manager’s
incentive6 is determined as a proportion   of shareholder’s return. This is to be noted that
the manager is not credited for meeting their loan (deposit) obligations. But they can be
reprimanded for failing to meet the requirements. The incentive is made public at t=2.
Shareholders are satisfied with the portion of incentive provided it does not discount that
the equity value of the shareholders. At t=1,
,
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Where Ke is the cost of equity. Here for our analysis Ke is taken as zero .
Proposition 3.1: given the proportion of equity   , and the effort, the equity value of the firm at t=2 is
given as:
 2 ( )1
xE S i r Ix 
3.2 project selection process
the project is selected (To be Continued…)
6 Incentive is over the wage received by the manager.
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